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I. INTRODUCTION 
The advent of computer technology has changed the way society 
communicates, conducts business, and wages war. But despite the increasingly 
martial nature of the computer, the law of armed conflict (also known as 
international humanitarian law) has yet to react to the destructive nature of 
computer-based conflict. While the wider lay public has begun to recognize and 
fear the enemy at the other end of the fiber-optic cable, cyberattacks have captured 
the imaginations of politicians, generals and pop culture,1 not everyone agrees on 
                                                                                                                                         
 * Law & Government Fellow, American University; JD, Cleveland-Marshall College of 
Law, Cleveland State University. Terence would like to thank his awesome family and his 
fiancée Monica for their support and inspiration. The views and opinions expressed herein are 
solely those of the author, and do not represent American University, Cleveland-Marshall 
College of Law, or any other person or entity. 
 1 See, e.g., SKYFALL (Eon Productions 2012) (depicting the classic Bond villain as a maniac 
who is able to carry out sophisticated and destructive cyberattacks); CALL OF DUTY: BLACK OPS II 
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cyber war’s importance,2 or even its existence. This complicates any strategic 
approach to dealing with cyber-security as the disagreements in the technical and 
legal discourse hinder the decision-making process. Some commentators state that 
there may be no “cyberwar,”3 or that any “cybertreaty” is unnecessary,4 or that 
existing norms are “good enough.”5 Answers to lingering questions about how 
malware affects conflict resolution, jus ad bellum and jus in bello need to be 
answered before computer technology compels a response from the legal 
community. The current state of law pertaining to “cyberwarfare”6 is still 
undeveloped and ambivalent on many issues.7  
Even if one hesitates to characterize a cyberattack as an armed attack,8 the 
chaotic nature of cyberconflict demands attention, and the hawkish nature of 
politicians and military leaders regarding cybersecurity lends a desperate urgency to 
the conflict.9 To complicate matters, international discourse often fixates on the 
contents of the cyber security lexicon.10 Similar attention is paid to civic issues like 
                                                                                                                                         
(Activision 2012) (using a global cyberattack as the major plot point); Lance Whitney, U.S. 
General Warns of Iran’s Growing Cyber Strength, CNET NEWS (Jan. 18, 2013), 
http://www.cnet.com/news/u-s-general-warns-of-irans-growing-cyber-strength/; Deborah Charles, 
U.S. Homeland Chief: Cyber 9/11 Could Happen “Imminently,” REUTERS (Jan. 24, 2013), 
http://www.reuters.com/article/2013/01/24/us-usa-cyber-threat-idUSBRE90N1A320130124. 
 2 Jason Healey, No, Cyberwarfare Isn’t as Dangerous as Nuclear War, U.S. NEWS & 
WORLD REPORT (Mar. 20, 2013), http://www.usnews.com/opinion/blogs/world-
report/2013/03/20/cyber-attacks-not-yet-an-existential-threat-to-the-us. 
 3 Cyber War May Never Take Place, KING’S COLL. LONDON (Oct. 10, 2011), 
http://www.kcl.ac.uk/newsevents/news/newsrecords/2011/10October/Cyber-war-might-never-
happen.aspx. 
 4 Sean Lawson, Cyberwarfare Treaty Would Be Premature, Unnecessary and Ineffective, 
U.S. NEWS & WORLD REPORT (June 8, 2012, 4:14 PM), http://www.usnews.com/debate-
club/should-there-be-an-international-treaty-on-cyberwarfare/cyberwarfare-treaty-would-be-
premature-unnecessary-and-ineffective. 
 5 NATO Official: Existing Rules for Global Cyberdefense Good Enough, 27 INSIDE THE 
PENTAGON, no. 13, Mar. 31, 2011, http://insidedefense.com (on file with author).  
 6 Understandably, this is a contentious term. See infra note 10 for a brief discussion of the 
cyber-security lexicon.  
 7 For example, the United States Department of Defense makes no mention of how the 
norms of the Laws of Armed Conflict (LOACs) apply to cyberspace. See generally U.S. 
DEP’T OF DEF., DEP’T OF DEF. STRATEGY FOR OPERATING IN CYBERSPACE (2011), 
http://www.defense.gov/news/d20110714cyber.pdf. 
 8 As contemplated by Article 51 of the U.N. Charter. See U.N. Charter art. 51. 
 9 Jordan Chandler Hirsch & Sam Adelsberg, An Elizabethan Cyberwar, N.Y. TIMES, May 
31, 2013, http://www.nytimes.com/2013/06/01/opinion/an-elizabethan-
cyberwar.html?pagewanted=all&_r=0 (“This emergence of cyber hawks in both nations raises 
the odds of a hack becoming a cyberwar. These voices could pressure both nations to treat any 
escalating cyberconflict as a latter-day Cuban missile crisis.”). 
 10 Daniel J. Ryan, Maeve Dion & Eneken Tikk, International Cyberlaw: A Normative 
Approach, 42 GEO. J. INT’L L. 1161, 1166-67 (2011); see also Jeffrey Carr, What is 
Cyberwar?, SLATE (Aug. 12, 2011), http://www.slate.com/articles/technology/ 
future_tense/2011/08/what_is_cyberwar.html (“U.S. Senators have complained recently that 
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citizens’ freedom and privacy in cyberspace.11 One of the recent major developments 
in the law of armed conflict is the Tallinn Manual.12 The Manual represents one of 
the first documents devoted solely to exploring how events in cyberspace happen 
affect the operation of the law of armed conflict.13 Naturally, the Manual is limited in 
scope because very few cyberattacks would be of the nature and severity to prompt 
an analysis under the laws of armed conflict.14 But it is precisely these sorts of 
attacks that give form to the fears of policymakers. This review will analyze the 
effectiveness of the Tallinn Manual in answering the question of how international 
humanitarian law deal with cyber warfare, and whether there are any usable norms 
that organizations like NATO could employ in responding to a cyber attack.15 
This review folds out in four parts. While the problem of cyberconflict has been 
briefly introduced in Part I, the forthcoming pages will highlight the vexing legal 
issues posed by hackers, cyber soldiers, and malware. In Part II, this Review will 
present a brief background on NATO to give the reader a slight background on the 
history and structure of that organization, especially since NATO (and its 
Cooperative Cyber Defense Center of Excellence (“CCDCOE”)) played a large role 
laying the groundwork in the composition of the Manual. In addition, Part II will 
discuss prevailing trends in the cybersecurity/“cyberwar” law to help illustrate the 
salience of the issue and the role that NATO fills in the global security community, 
which will show why the Tallinn Manual is so important to this global discussion. 
In Part III, the Tallinn Manual’s sections on jus ad bellum will be evaluated to 
see how adequately it determines where cyberattacks fall within the “armed 
                                                                                                                                         
there’s still no clarity on what . . . would be considered an act of cyberwar.”) (“Howard 
Schmidt, the U.S. Cyber-Security Coordinator . . . said in an interview with Wired that ‘there 
is no cyberwar.’”). Laypersons frequently use terms like “cyberwarfare” with remarkable 
imprecision. See, e.g., Grant Brunner, US Congress: China’s Cyberwarfare is Becoming a 
Serious Problem for the United States, EXTREME TECH (Nov. 7, 2012, 10:54 AM), 
http://www.extremetech.com/extreme/139722-us-congress-china-cyberwarfare-is-becoming-
a-serious-problem-for-the-united-states (“A draft report from the U.S. Congress shows that 
Chinese cyberwarfare is a growing issue that leaves the United States vulnerable in a very 
serious way.”). There is no indication that the Chinese have engaged in any behavior that 
would constitute an armed attack. For an example of the misuse of the word “cyberattack,” see 
Paul Hales, Russians Launch Cyber Attack on Lithuania: Media Reports, SC MAGAZINE (July 
1, 2008, 10:03 AM), http://www.scmagazine.com.au/News/115647,russians-launch-cyber-
attack-on-lithuania-media-reports.aspx. 
 11 This is a tangential issue because the potential loss of liberty is a civil issue, one for 
resolution by individual nations/governments. Insofar as the LOAC and a NATO policy 
response is developed, the issue of civil liberty is one not appropriate for discussion here. As 
the field of LOAC for cyberspace develops, then discussion of reconciling security laws and 
civil liberties may be a field relevant for discussion.  
 12 TALLINN MANUAL ON THE INTERNATIONAL LAW APPLICABLE TO CYBER WARFARE 
(Michael Schmitt ed., 2013). 
 13 Id. 
 14 See Oona A. Hathaway et al., The Law of Cyber-Attack, 100 CALIF. L. REV. 817, 822 
(2012). 
 15 TALLINN MANUAL, supra note 12, at 11. The Manual is not fully or officially endorsed 
by NATO, but nevertheless its roots are borne out of the Alliance through NATO’s Collective 
Cyber-Defense Center of Excellence. 
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attack”/“illegal use of force” paradigm. Particular attention will be paid to whether 
the doctrine of the manual is (1) sufficiently cognizant of the theoretical 
underpinnings of the law of war (what does the law of war seek to achieve), and (2) 
how well the doctrinal rules of the Manual can be used in practical situations. 
Following this analysis, this article will evaluate the Manual’s shortfalls.  
To briefly foreshadow, it is often the case that new legal works sometimes fall 
short, even though its drafter(s) are exceedingly qualified and its intentions are pure. 
The Tallinn Manual is one such work. While the doctrinal rules of the Manual are a 
solid first step towards articulating new rules for an age of cyber warfare, there are 
some fundamental problems. The Manual is at times divorced from the theoretical 
foundations of the law of war and how the Manual’s rules will operate in a practical 
setting. Even though the manual is an imperfect guide, it is this Author’s conclusion 
that something is better than nothing.  
II. BACKGROUND 
A. The NATO Charter and its Subsequent Redirections 
NATO was founded in 194916 near the outset of the Cold War. Its primary 
purpose was to organize the collective defense of Western Europe, contemplating an 
eventual armed struggle with the military forces of the Soviet Bloc and the 
contemporaneously formed Warsaw Pact.17 But NATO was far from a regional 
partisan organization. The Washington Treaty, which brought the Alliance into 
existence, enshrines many of the principles of the United Nations Charter18and even 
gives deference to the United Nations Security Council19 within key articles of the 
treaty.20  
                                                                                                                                         
 16 See North Atlantic Treaty art. 1, Apr. 4, 1949, 63 Stat. 2241, 34 U.N.T.S. 243 
[hereinafter NATO Treaty] (founding of NATO was based on the adoption of this treaty). 
 17 NATO, A Short History of NATO, http://www.nato.int/history/nato-history.html (last 
visited Oct. 15, 2014) (listing Soviet aggression and expansionism as one of the main reasons 
for the formation of the Alliance, as well as the suppression of nationalist militarism and the 
encouragement of European political integration and cooperation). 
 18 NATO Treaty, supra note 16, at art. 1 (“The Parties undertake, as set forth in the 
Charter of the United Nations, to settle any international dispute in which they may be 
involved by peaceful means . . . .”). 
 19 It is interesting to note that provisions relating to peacekeeping action of the United 
Nations Security Council (UNSC) given the composition of the Council. It seems unlikely that 
the UNSC would be able to form the necessary agreements to take action in any regard, let 
alone in a geographic area where Cold War tensions were high and military conflict was 
contemplated (hence the creation of NATO).  
 20 See NATO Treaty, supra note 16, at art. 5 (“[A]ll measures taken as a result thereof 
shall immediately be reported to the Security Council. Such measures shall be terminated 
when the Security Council has taken the measures necessary to restore and maintain 
international peace and security.”). These principles are again a curious indication of the spirit 
of international security and multilateralism that NATO purports to uphold as noted in note 
29. It is unlikely, however, that the Allies would have borne the political cost of repudiating 
the Chapter VII powers of the U.N. Charter in order to circumvent the shifting of 
responsibility when the conditions needed in order to perform such a shift would never arise 
during the Cold War.  
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Article 5 is the most important of all the articles of the Washington Treaty as it 
sets forth NATO’s primary operational and legal mandate. It reads:  
[T]he Parties agree that an armed attack against one or more of them in 
Europe or North America shall be considered an attack against them all 
and consequently they agree that, if such an armed attack occurs, each of 
them, in exercise of the right of individual or collective self-defence 
recognized by Article 51 of the Charter of the United Nations, will assist 
the Party or Parties so attacked by taking forthwith, individually and in 
concert with the other Parties, such action as it deems necessary, 
including the use of armed force, to restore and maintain the security of 
the North Atlantic area . . . .21 
In summary, Article 5 provides that if any member suffers an attack, all other 
members shall respond as if the attack was directed against them personally. This 
article multiplies the deterrent capabilities of all of the NATO member nations: not 
only does each nation gain the strength of the other members, but smaller nations can 
use the entire Alliance and its capabilities as a whole to shield22 against threats to 
their national security.   
But no mere act of force23 will trigger the activation of Article 5: Only an “armed 
attack”24 will do. Thus, simple acts of force, (including economic force and other 
coercive measures) would not meet the Article 5 threshold.  
No simple armed attack will do either, because small border actions or a skirmish 
would not trigger the activation of Article 5.25 Even if one NATO member nation 
pushed for the invocation of Article 5,26 the relevant text of the treaty is nevertheless 
permissive: NATO member nations are not compelled to do anything beyond “such 
action as it deems necessary.”27 In marked contrast to a small armed incident, the 
terrorist attacks of September 11, 2001 were met with a collective response under 
Article 5.28 NATO adopts this approach because it seeks to minimize threats to the 
                                                                                                                                         
 21 NATO Treaty, supra note 16, at art. 5. 
 22 For example, the Baltic States (Estonia, Latvia, Lithuania) rely and depend on NATO to 
secure their territorial integrity vis-à-vis air patrols. See Baltic Air Policing, WIKIPEDIA, 
http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Baltic_Air_Policing (last visited Dec. 8, 2014). 
 23 For contrast, compare the language of the U.N. Charter’s blanket prohibition on the use 
of force in U.N. Charter art. 2(4).   
 24 See NATO Treaty, supra note 16, at art. 5. 
 25 See Turkey to Push NATO to Consider Syria's Downing of Turkish Jet as Attack on Military 
Alliance, FOXNEWS.COM, June 25, 2012, http://www.foxnews.com/world/2012/06/25/ syria-fires-
at-second-turkish-plane-deputy-prime-minister-says/ (“Turkey will push NATO to consider the 
jet's downing under Article 5 in a key alliance treaty. Article 5 states that an attack against one 
NATO member shall be considered an attack against all members.”). 
 26 Id. (“Asked if Turkey will insist on the activation of Article 5 of NATO, Arinc [the 
deputy prime minister of Turkey] said, ‘No doubt, Turkey has made necessary applications 
with NATO regarding Article 4 and Article 5.’”). 
 27 See NATO Treaty, supra note 16, at art. 5. 
 28 See Edgar Buckley, Invoking Article 5, NATO REVIEW (Summer 2006), 
http://www.nato.int/docu/review/2006/issue2/english/art2.html (“Canadian Ambassador 
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entire North Atlantic region and as a result, a high threshold of the use and impact of 
force is implied in Article 5.29  
But the Washington Treaty is not a static document. The drafters of the treaty 
recognized that the security environment of the Transatlantic Region may change, 
and, as a result, built the opportunity for periodic review into the treaty itself.30 
While amending the treaty outright has only occurred in a few instances,31 the 
Alliance has developed a unique way to reformulate Alliance-wide strategy without 
editing the Treaty’s text through the drafting and adoption of “Strategic Concepts,” 
which are documents that capture the Alliance’s current operational and dynamic 
view of the NATO Charter.32 Each Strategic Concept, drafted by a group of experts, 
outlines and defines what security issues are important to NATO, and how to deal 
with those security issues in a wider geopolitical context.33  
To transition into a new age of warfighting, NATO has sought to create means of 
supplementing and supporting Alliance members by pooling resources and 
enhancing cooperation between nations,34 but has yet to devise a way to bind the 
members to a common course of development, especially in the field of 
cyberconflict. Given NATO’s encounters with cyberconflict35 and its endemic 
political difficulties,36 the Alliance needs to develop a mechanism to institute clear 
                                                                                                                                         
David Wright . . . who was also dean of the Council, assured him of the support of all the 
Allies. ‘Hell, this is an Alliance,’ he said. ‘We've got Article 5.’”). 
 29 Id. (“The scale was important, we felt, because the Washington Treaty had been written 
to deal with threats to peace and security in the North Atlantic area, which implied a high 
threshold of the use or impact of force.”). 
 30 NATO Treaty, supra note 16, at art. 13. 
 31 Ulf Haußler, Cyber Security and Defence From the Perspective of Articles 4 and 5 of 
the NATO Treaty, in INTERNATIONAL CYBER SECURITY LEGAL & POLICY PROCEEDINGS 100, 
108 (Cooperative Cyber Defense Center of Excellence ed., 2010), available at 
http://www.ccdcoe.org/publications/legalproceedings/Haussler_CDfromArticles4and5Perspec
tive.pdf (“The attack on the United States of America on 11 September 2001 (hereinafter 
referred to as '9/11') represents the only case in which NATO's collective self-defence 
mechanism was used.”). 
 32 Jens Ringsmose & Sten Rynning, Come Home, NATO? The Atlantic Alliance’s New 
Strategic Concept, 6 DANISH INST. FOR INT’L STUDIES, , DIIS REPORT (Danish Inst. for Int’l 
Studies, Copenhagen, Den.), available at http://www.econstor.eu/bitstream/10419/ 
59829/1/593489322.pdf. 
 33 Id. (“[T]he Strategic Concept must specifically interpret concrete geopolitical 
circumstances.”). 
 34 Press Release, NATO, Summit Declaration on Defence Capabilities: Toward NATO 
Forces 2020 (May 20, 2012), http://www.nato.int/cps/en/natolive/ 
official_texts_87594.htm?mode=pressrelease. 
 35 See infra Part II(B).  
 36 Nowhere else is this frustrating (perhaps even toxic) divergence of national interests 
more apparent than in the case of the potential accession of the Former Yugoslav Republic of 
Macedonia (FYROM). See Karl-Heinz Kamp, NATO Enlargement Reloaded, 81 RESEARCH 
PAPER (Research Division – NATO Defence College, Rome, Italy), Sept. 2012, at 2, available 
at http://www.ndc.nato.int/download/downloads.php?icode=349 (“Other Allies, particularly 
the United States, are becoming increasingly impatient with the Greek obstructionism . . . .”). 
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legal norms that can serve as guidelines to NATO personnel, agencies, and its 
member nations. Perhaps the Tallinn Manual can guide the Alliance in a rapidly 
developing world of cyberconflict and information warfare. 
B. NATO’s Encounters with Cyberwarfare 
The operational and legal needs of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization and its 
member nations concerning cyberconflict are unique and specific.37 Yet for an 
organization tasked with ensuring the defense of the Transatlantic Region,38 it 
continues to have difficulties39 in modernizing and updating its operational 
capabilities.40 These difficulties manifest themselves in the hurried development of 
NATO facilities designed to combat the role of cyber-threats. 
In 1999, NATO became concerned with the security of its military information 
networks after the websites of Supreme Headquarters Allied Powers Europe 
(“SHAPE”) and other NATO entities were targeted by Denial of Service (“DOS”) 
attacks41 during the conduction of NATO’s Operation Allied Force42 (NATO’s air 
operations against Yugoslavia during the Kosovo War). Growing out of this set of 
initial attacks, NATO adopted the Cyber Defense Program (“CDP”) at the 2002 
Prague Summit.43 In the years immediately after the adoption of the CDP, there was 
little progress in developing NATO’s cyberdefence capabilities.  
This changed in 2007. That year, the Republic of Estonia, a member-nation of 
NATO, experienced a massive Distributed Denial of Service (“DDOS”) attack that 
                                                                                                                                         
If NATO (as a whole) is subject to the whims of one nation-state on a relatively non-
controversial issue, then the Alliance’s ability to exercise effectively in contested areas of 
policy or during a crisis is naturally in question. 
 37 See NATO Frequently Asked Questions, http://www.nato.int/cps/en/natolive/faq.htm 
(last updated Mar. 11, 2009). 
 38 Davis Brown, The Role of Regional Organizations in Stopping Civil Wars, 41 A.F. L. 
REV. 235, 242-43 (1997).    
 39 The fiscal difficulties in upgrading military equipment and infrastructure that face the 
Alliance are all the more apparent, as according to 2011 estimates, on average, NATO 
countries spend only 3.8 percent of their defense budgets on infrastructure maintenance. See 
Press Release, NATO, Financial and Economic Data Relating to NATO Defence (Apr. 13, 
2012), 
http://www.nato.int/nato_static/assets/pdf/pdf_2012_04/20120413_PR_CP_2012_047_rev1.p
df. By looking at this report, many Alliance neophytes spend more than sixty percent of their 
annual defense budgets on personnel and retirement costs.  
 40 See Fahad Ullah Khan, States Rather Than Criminals Pose a Greater Threat to Global 
Cyber Security: A Critical Analysis, 31 STRATEGIC STUDIES 91, 91, (2011), available at 
http://issi.org.pk/wp-content/uploads/2014/06/1328592265_43276030.pdf. 
 41 Jason Healey & Klara Tothova Jordan, NATO’s Cyber Capabilities: Yesterday, Today, 
and Tomorrow, ATL. COUNCIL OF THE U.S., Sept. 2014, at 1, available at 
http://www.atlanticcouncil.org/images/publications/NATOs_Cyber_Capabilities.pdf. 
 42 Operation Allied Force was an aerial bombardment campaign conducted in order to 
force military units of the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia from Kosovo. See Operation Allied 
Force, U.S. DEP’T OF DEF., http://www.defense.gov/specials/kosovo/ (last visited June 19, 
2013).  
 43 Id.  
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crippled the nation’s information networks, media outlets, and the entire nation’s 
financial sector.44 The attack lasted for almost a month, and the frequency and 
ferocity of the attacks was unprecedented. As a result, the Cooperative Cyber-
Defence Centre of Excellence (“CCDCOE”) and the Cyber Defense Management 
Agency (“CDMA”) were founded in 2008.45 The most recent Strategic Concept,46 
adopted in November 2010, outlined the importance of NATO’s role in contributing 
to cybersecurity.47 NATO 2020, a policy report published by the NATO Group of 
Experts48 in preparation for the release of the 2010 NATO Strategic Concept, named 
cyberattacks of varying degrees of severity as the third greatest threat to the security 
of the Alliance.49  
Yet, the development of NATO’s cyberdefence forces is not without its 
challenges. The CCDCOE (located in Tallinn, Estonia) is staffed by less than fifty 
personnel and it is located in a repurposed army barracks dating back to the Tsarist 
era.50 Only eleven of the twenty-eight NATO allies are participants in the 
CCDCOE.51 This may indicate a lack of political will in committing to cyberdefence 
research and may show a reluctance to embrace new international norms. 
C. Other Viewpoints on Cyber-Warfare 
Other major powers diverge on what security in cyberspace should entail. On one 
hand, Russia and China are concerned with “information security,” choosing to focus 
on what information is protected and how it can be protected, while the more 
                                                                                                                                         
 44 Sverre Myrli, NATO and Cyber Defence, NATO Parliamentary Assembly, 173 DSCFC 
09 E BIS (2009). 
 45 Id. 
 46 The Strategic Concept is an assessment that outlines the broad strategic objectives for 
NATO for the period following its adoption. See NATO, NATO’s New Strategic Concept, 
http://www.nato.int/strategic-concept/ (last visited Dec. 8, 2014).  
 47 NATO, Strategic Concept for the Defence and Security of the Members of the North 
Atlantic Treaty Organization, ACTIVE ENGAGEMENT, MODERN DEFENCE (NATO Summit, 
Lisbon, Portugal), Nov. 19-20, 2010, at 11, 16-17, available at http://www.nato.int/strategic-
concept/pdf/Strat_Concept_web_en.pdf. 
 48 For more information on the NATO Group of Experts, see NATO, Group of Experts, 
http://www.nato.int/strategic-concept/experts-strategic-concept.html (last visited Sept. 9, 
2014). 
 49 NATO 2020: Assured Security; Dynamic Engagement, GROUP OF EXPERTS (NATO 
Summit Report, Lisbon, Portugal), May 17, 2010, at 17, available at 
http://www.nato.int/nato_static/assets/pdf/pdf_2010_05/20100517_100517_expertsreport.pdf. 
 50 Valentina Pop, Estonia Training NATO ‘Techies’ for Cyberwar, EUOBSERVER.COM 
(June 14, 2011, 9:29 AM), http://euobserver.com/cyber/32479. To add to the institutional 
frustrations, the CCDCOE, though it is a part of NATO’s wider educational framework 
managed by Allied Command Transformation (ACT), is not a part of NATO’s command 
structure. All Centers of Excellence (COEs) are considered international military 
organizations. See NATO, Centres of Excellence, 
http://www.nato.int/cps/en/natolive/topics_68372.htm (last visited Aug. 26, 2012). 
 51 Press Release, NATO Cooperative Cyber Defense Centre of Excellence (CCDCOE), 
Netherlands Joins the Centre (Apr. 5, 2012), http://www.ccdcoe.org/netherlands-joins-
centre.html. 
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“Western” approach opts to focus on a model of “cyberspace security” which places 
the security and integrity of networks and information infrastructure as the primary 
area of concern.52 Another viewpoint comes from Fahad Ullah Khan, a Research 
Fellow at Pakistan’s Institute of Strategic Studies Islamabad (“ISSI”). Fahad states 
that cybersecurity should not focus on whether state-based attacks or criminal attacks 
are more threatening to global security; rather, Khan outlines the need for legal 
guidelines to govern all types of attacks within cyberspace.53 He notes that a simple 
technical solution to the cybersecurity problem is inadequate54—without enforceable 
rules and norms, perpetrators (state or individuals) will not be deterred from 
strategically mounting cyberattacks in the long term.55  
In terms of technical development, the field of cybersecurity is one of dynamism. 
Iran, a recent victim of a robust cyberattack,56 has started a “cyber-warfare” initiative 
that is designed to counter cyberattacks that use malware and viruses like Stuxnet 
and Duqu,57 rumored to have sparked the development of an expensive Iranian 
cyberwarfare program.58 These are examples of the growing amount of focus, 
attention, and money that states are devoting in order to defend their vital 
information networks. 
In some cases, the actions of states go beyond simple defense. Embattled regimes 
can use the tactics of cybercriminals and cyberattackers to suppress rebel or dissident 
movements within their nations. In Syria, the Assad regime has taken advantage of 
the fact that the government controls the country’s information networks, and has 
used such control to hack into rebel computers and mobile phones.59 This aspect of 
Syrian conflict indicates a fundamental truth: that a cyber-savvy opponent can be as 
much of an asymmetric threat as its purely conventional counterpart. If skills in 
                                                                                                                                         
 52 Adam Segal, The Role of Cyber-Security in US-China Relations, EAST ASIA FORUM 
(June 21, 2011), http://www.eastasiaforum.org/2011/06/21/the-role-of-cyber-security-in-us-
china-relations/. 
 53 See generally Khan, supra note 40 (declining to analyze the overall importance of 
cybercrime in the face of more geopolitically pressing issues related to cybersecurity). 
 54 See id. at 102. 
 55 Id. at 103. 
 56 Gary Brown, Why Iran Didn’t Admit Stuxnet was an Attack, 63  
JOINT FORCE QUARTERLY 70, 70 (Oct. 1, 2011), available at 
http://www.academia.edu/4237109/Why_Iran_Wont_Admit_Stuxnet_Was_an_Attack. 
 57 Stuxnet was a computer worm designed to target supervisory control and data 
acquisition (SCADA) systems in computers produced by German technology company 
Siemens. See SCADA, WIKIPEDIA, http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/SCADA (last visited June 3, 
2014). Duqu is a variant of the original Stuxnet worm, but instead of causing damage like 
Stuxnet, Duqu is designed to infiltrate and gather information on system vulnerabilities. See 
Duqu, WIKIPEDIA, http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Duqu (last visited Jan. 15, 2015). See David 
Shamah, Top Security Exec: Beware the ‘Sons of Stuxnet,’ THE TIMES OF ISRAEL (June 3, 2013 
2:41 PM), http://www.timesofisrael.com/top-security-exec-beware-the-sons-of-stuxnet/.  
 58 Yaakov Katz, Iran Embarks on $1B. Cyber-Warfare Program, THE JERUSALEM POST 
(Dec. 18, 2011), http://www.jpost.com/Defense/Iran-embarks-on-1b-cyber-warfare-program. 
 59 Jay Newton-Small, Hillary’s Little Startup: How the U.S, Is Using Technology to Help 
Syria’s Rebels, TIME (June 13, 2012), http://world.time.com/2012/06/13/hillarys-little-startup-
how-the-u-s-is-using-technology-to-aid-syrias-rebels/. 
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cybersecurity can enable dissidents, protestors, and rebels to maximize their tactical 
capabilities, the same naturally follows for smaller nations with small militaries. 
The Syrian situation, however, is unique in that the government controls a large 
portion of the information networks.60 In the West, private companies own more than 
eighty percent of the information infrastructure, and those companies do not 
collaborate with their governments on cybersecurity.61 One reason civilian networks 
are now a concern is because programmable logic controllers (“PLCs”)62 
(predominantly owned and operated by civilian and private sector entities) can be 
damaged or destroyed by cyberattacks, and as a result may cripple many vital 
governmental and quasi-governmental services. Security and law are no longer 
separate disciplines.63  
III. DISCUSSION 
A. The Drafters of the Tallinn Manual 
The Drafters of the Tallinn Manual constitute a group of well-qualified experts 
hailing from many nations, including the United States, Canada, Australia, Belgium, 
the Netherlands, the United Kingdom, and Sweden.64 Collectively, these experts are 
referred to as the “International Group of Experts.”65 This independent group is the 
entity responsible for the drafting of the Tallinn Manual.  
B. The Scope and Effect of the Tallinn Manual 
In response to the widespread institutional and international confusion on where 
to place acts of cyber warfare within the Law of Armed Conflict, the CCDCOE 
invited the International Group of Experts to draft a manual addressing the confusion 
vis-à-vis “cyberwar.”66 The CCDCOE, however, is not a part of NATO’s 
overarching command structure, it receives no funding from NATO, and though 
each operational center is “accredited” by NATO, member nations must sign 
memoranda of understanding (“MOU”) in order to join in a center’s operations.67 As 
                                                                                                                                         
 60 Id.  
 61 See generally Khan, supra note 40 (noting that the lack cooperation between the private 
sector and the government in the area of cybersecurity poses security threats). 
 62 PLCs are parts of SCADA systems, which are critical to modern infrastructure systems 
like water purification plants. See SCADA, supra note 61. 
 63 March of the Robots, THE ECONOMIST, June 2, 2012, at 13, available at 
http://www.economist.com/node/21556103. 
 64 TALLINN MANUAL, supra note 12, at x-xiii. 
 65 Id. 
 66 Id.  
 67 NATO, Centres of Excellence, http://www.nato.int/cps/en/natolive/topics_68372.htm 
(last visited Aug. 26, 2012) (“Although not part of the NATO command structure, they are 
part of a wider framework supporting NATO Command Arrangements . . . . Once ACT 
approves the concept, the COE and any NATO country that wishes to participate in the COE’s 
activities then negotiate two Memorandums of Understanding (MOU) . . . . The Alliance does 
not fund COEs. Instead, they receive national or multinational support, with “Framework 
Nations”, “Sponsoring Nations” and “Contributing Nations” financing the operating costs of 
the institutions.”). 
10https://engagedscholarship.csuohio.edu/clevstlrev/vol63/iss2/12
2015] THE TALLINN MANUAL’S JUS AD BELLUM DOCTRINE 505 
a result, the Tallinn Manual is like other legal manuals regulating warfare on the sea 
and in the air—it is a well crafted, but nonetheless non-binding legal document.68 
But the Tallinn Manual promises to impact future legal development despite its 
non-binding effects. It analyzes cyberattacks through the lens of international 
humanitarian law, paying attention to how jus ad bellum and jus in bello are applied 
to acts within cyberspace. Like this article, the Tallinn Manual pays little attention to 
traditional constitution of electronic warfare or issues like intellectual property theft, 
espionage, or other cybersecurity issues that do not warrant an international 
humanitarian law analysis,69 especially under jus ad bellum.70 
C. The Composition of the Tallinn Manual 
According to the online manuscript,71 the Tallinn Manual is divided into two 
parts: Part A (a discussion of international cyber security law, but really pertaining to 
jus ad bellum), and Part B (a discussion of the law of cyber armed conflict/jus in 
bello).72 Between the two parts, there are seven chapters that pertain to subjects such 
as state acts in cyberspace, the protection of specific classes of persons, and the 
applicability of the law of armed conflict to acts within cyberspace.73 Within the 
seven chapters, there are ninety-five rules that articulate the International Group of 
Experts’ views on a wide range of legal issues.74  
Although many of the Manual’s rules are prospective and extremely specific, it is 
unclear whether a situation would ever arise where these specific rules would be 
needed to determine the legal repercussions of a cyberattack on medical vehicles, 
equipment or personnel.75 Regardless of whether a cyberattack would actually be 
directed against the aforementioned targets, such an act would be regulated by 
already standing norms of International Humanitarian Law.76 Thus, much of the 
                                                                                                                                         
 68 TALLINN MANUAL, supra note 12, at 11. This point is clearly articulated in the following 
statement: “The Manual does not represent the views of the NATO CCD COE, its sponsoring 
nations, or NATO. In particular, it is not meant to reflect NATO doctrine.” Id. 
 69 Id. at 4. 
 70 Unlike entities like the European Union (for example), NATO has no operational (or 
legal) mandate to delve into policymaking on civilian or domestic cybersecurity issues. See 
Alexander Klimburg & Heli Tirmaa-Klaar, CYBERSECURITY AND CYBERPOWER: CONCEPTS, 
CONDITIONS AND CAPABILITIES FOR COOPERATION FOR ACTION WITHIN THE EU, EUROPEAN 
PARLIAMENT (Directorate-General for External Policies of the Union, Wiertz, Brussels (2011), 
at 26-27. As a result, NATO’s role has been one of facilitator, not policymaker. See id.  
 71 The TALLINN MANUAL can be found online. Tallinn Manual on the International Law 
Applicable to Cyber Warfare, http://issuu.com/nato_ccd_coe/docs/tallinnmanual. 
 72 The discussion of cyber armed conflict deals with various issues such as respecting 
neutrality (Chapter VII), specific rules on targeting protected persons like children, clergy, 
journalists, etc. (Chapter V), and general rules for the conduct of hostilities (Chapter IV). Id. 
at vi-xi. In this regard, the TALLINN MANUAL is little more than text that applies “traditional” 
International Humanitarian Law. See id.  
 73 TALLINN MANUAL, supra note 12. 
 74 Id.   
 75 Id. at 204-05. 
 76 This principle is actually illustrated by the TALLINN MANUAL itself. See id.  
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Tallinn Manual’s jus in bello analysis77 seems to be nothing more than a reiteration 
of the general applicability of the law of war to cyberattacks and cyberwarfare.78 The 
most contentious issues discussed by the Manual are not how a cyberwar should be 
fought, but rather how to identify and how to respond to the start of a cyberwar.  
D. Discussing the Adequacy of the Tallinn Manual: Did the Drafters Leave Gaps? 
Part A of the Tallinn Manual discussed the jus ad bellum of cyberconflict. As a 
political and military alliance that must conduct itself in accordance with 
international law, what should concern NATO is whether the Tallinn Manual’s jus 
ad bellum analysis is lacking in any significant respect. Simply put, do the ninety-
five black letter rules of the Manual leave gaps that can exploited by those who seek 
to make war via cyberspace?  How well does the doctrine of the Manual consider the 
theoretical goals of jus ad bellum while still considering the practical application and 
operation of the Manual’s “Rules”? To answer this question, this article will consider 
the Manual’s major jus ad bellum provisions: Rule 9, Rule 10, Rule 11, and Rule 13.   
1. Rule Nine: Countermeasures 
Rules Six, Seven and Eight outline some norms for attributing cyberattacks in 
rather ordinary fashion.79 These rules establish that the mere fact alone that a 
cyberattack originates in a state’s territory and/or that a cyberattack is routed through 
a state’s cyber infrastructure is not enough to attribute that attack to the state in 
question.80 Rule Nine regulates a victimized state’s potential countermeasures to a 
cyber operation. The rule states that: “[a] State injured by an internationally 
wrongful act may resort to proportionate countermeasures, including cyber 
countermeasures, against the responsible State.”81 The International Group of 
Experts note that this rule is little more than an extension of the customary 
international law articulated in the International Law Commission’s (“ILC”) Articles 
on State Responsibility.82 In addition to the limits imposed on State countermeasures, 
the Group of Experts notes that when the exact nature or responsible party of a cyber 
attack cannot be ascertained, a state could nevertheless employ countermeasures 
based on the plea of necessity.83 Substantively, one can conclude that NATO’s 
                                                                                                                                         
 77 The jus in bello analysis comprises Part B of the TALLINN MANUAL. Id. at 42. 
 78 Just as the Geneva Conventions look to the results of the act (i.e. the injury to sick 
soldiers, killing civilians, etc.) instead of how the acts were committed (gun vs. knife), the 
International Group of Experts makes no differentiation between a cyberattack and a 
conventional use of force. See Fourth Geneva Conventions, Aug. 12, 1949, 75 U.N.T.S. 287.  
 79 TALLINN MANUAL, supra note 12, at 29-36 (Rules Six through Eight consider issues that 
are not completely germane or essential to the jus ad bellum analysis).  
 80 Id. 
 81 Id. at 36 (emphasis added). 
 82 Id.; see also U.N. Int’l Law Comm’n, Responsibility of States for Internationally 
Wrongful Acts, art. 22, G.A. Res. 56/83 Annex, U.N. Doc A/RES/56/83 (Dec. 12, 2001). 
 83 See TALLINN MANUAL, supra note 12, at 38. If a state uses the plea of necessity to 
justify the countermeasures, choosing such a course of action must have been the only way to 
protect a state’s vital interests; see also Gabčikovo-Nagymoros Project (Hung. v. Slovak.), 
1997 I.C.J. 7, ¶ 55 (Sept. 25, 1997). 
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interests are as equally protected under this legal approach, but practice and 
increased incidence rates of cyber-incidents may give rise to challenges.84 For better 
or worse, the customary law that governs countermeasures is unchanged for 
cyberconflict, and thus the Tallinn Manual does not create any legal gaps that were 
not extant before the advent of cyberwarfare.  
2. Rule Ten: Prohibition of Threat or Use of Force 
Rule Ten extends the well-settled prohibition85 on the use of force to cyber 
operations that constitute a threat or use of force. The prohibitory norm, as 
established by Article 2, paragraph 4 of the UN Charter, indicates that any use of 
force is presumptively illegal.86 Both the prohibition and the presumption on the 
issue of force could be considered part of customary international law on the use of 
force. What does this conclusion mean for NATO? By using and extending 
customary international law to cyberconflict, the Tallinn Manual has disambiguated 
the nature of cyber operations and sends a clear legal message to nation-states: 
because a given cyberattack may not rise to the level of an “armed attack” does not 
mean that it is not illegal.87 Although the International Group of Experts did not 
articulate a remedial scheme for a victim state, it would be reasonable to conclude 
that a state could engage in countermeasures (as defined in Rule 9), or seek remedy 
in the International Court of Justice.88 Overall, the Tallinn Manual did treat the issue 
of the use of force in cyberspace adequately: it clearly and unequivocally stated that 
a use of force, regardless of the means, is a violation of customary international law, 
                                                                                                                                         
 84 There could be a concern that the plea of necessity may be a difficult justification to 
prove or comply with because attributing cyberattacks is difficult even under the best of 
circumstances. See David Alexander, Defense Chief Calls Cyberspace Battlefield of the 
Future, REUTERS, Oct. 19, 2012 8:33 PM, available at 
http://www.reuters.com/article/2012/10/20/us-usa-defense-cyber-idUSBRE89J00920121020 
(“Identity and attribution on the Internet are not very robust. If you look at kind of the 
underlying protocols that kind of power the Internet . . . there's no real strong mechanism for 
identifying where something is coming from”). The potential for a state to act first and 
evaluate later is high indeed, especially if vital state interests are involved (i.e. the 
cyberattacks on Estonia that affected vital financial and banking infrastructure). In short, the 
TALLINN MANUAL should have looked to such an eventuality. 
 85 See Joseph Miljak, Forcing Sovereign Conformity: The Comprehensive Anti-Apartheid 
Act of 1986, 36 CLEV. ST. L. REV. 261, 284 (1988); John Yoo & Will Trachman, Less than 
Bargained for: The Use of Force and the Declining Relevance of the United Nations, 5 CHI. J. 
INT’L L. 379 (2005); Jessica Feil, Cyberwar and Unmanned Aerial Vehicles: Using New 
Technologies from Espionage to Action, 45 CASE W. RES. J. INT'L L. 513, 538-39 (2012) 
(noting in addition to the prohibition, that most non-covert cyber-activities may be a non-
armed attack use of force).    
 86 TALLINN MANUAL, supra note 12, at 42-43 (Rule 10). 
 87 Myriam Dunn Cavelty, Cyber Allies: Strengths and Weaknesses of NATO’s 
Cyberdefense Posture, 3 INTERNATIONALE POLITIK: GLOBAL EDITION 11, 14 (Mar. 2011), 
available at http://www.academia.edu/562910/Cyber-Allies_Strengths_and_weaknesses_of_ 
NATOs_cyberdefense_posture. 
 88 A victim of a cyberattack could probably bring suit in the ICJ, a situation analogous to 
the Nicaragua judgment. See generally Military and Paramilitary Activities In and Against 
Nicaragua (Nicar. v. U.S.), 1986 I.C.J. 14 (June 27, 1986). 
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an excellent outcome for NATO and the legal experts tasked with overseeing a 
national or institutional response to a cyberattack. Despite this clarification, 
uncertainties remain in the legal approach to cyber operations under the law of war 
paradigm.   
3. Rule Eleven: Definition of Use of Force 
Rule Eleven attempts to define “use of force” as it is defined in Rule Ten, but the 
rule simply states that a cyber “act” is a use of force when a comparable non-cyber 
act rises to the use of force threshold. 89 This tautology indicates that Rule Eleven 
has few concrete guideposts—an unfortunate circumstance for a field of law in dire 
need of certainty. The Manual notes that the only factor that is certain about the 
definition of the use of force is that such a definition is uncertain, stating in pertinent 
part: “There is no authoritative definition of, or criteria for, ‘threat’ or ‘use of 
force.’”90 Despite the lack of complete certainty, the International Group of Experts 
identified that there are some acts that are clearly not uses of force91 and as a result, 
the cyber analogs of such acts are also not uses of force. Inversely, there are some 
acts that are uses of force by virtue of being armed attacks.92 For the area in between 
these two extremes, the Tallinn Manual thankfully avoids reverting to the wisdom of 
Justice Potter of the United States Supreme Court93 and instead articulates several 
factors to be weighed when attempting to determine if a given act is a use of force. 
These factors are: (1) severity, (2) immediacy, (3) directness, (4) invasiveness, (5) 
measurability of effects, (6) military character, (7) state involvement, and (8) 
presumptive legality.94  
While all of these factors are useful for determining whether an act is a use of 
force, some factors are more pertinent than others. For example, the factors of 
immediacy and directness (factors that measure the effects of the cyber operation), 
ultimately hinge on the factor of “measurability of effects.” Thus, the two former 
factors may be ultimately useless in determining whether it is a use of force if there 
are difficulties in gauging the extent of the “effects”. It is equally important to note 
that other factors, like “military character” are not narrowly tailored to the essence of 
cyberconflict. While a cyber operation’s “military character” may indeed be 
                                                                                                                                         
 89 The text of Rule Eleven states, “A cyber operation constitutes a use of force when its 
scale and effects are comparable to non-cyber operations rising to the level of the use of 
force.” TALLINN MANUAL, supra note 12, at 45. 
 90 Id. at subsection 2. 
 91 The TALLINN MANUAL points to the extensive negotiations over how to characterize a 
use of force, with a majority of nations determining that mere economic or political pressure 
lies somewhere below the use of force threshold. See id. at 46-47. But just because economic 
or political pressure does not reach the use of force threshold does not mean that such pressure 
(or an analogous act) is legal, as such pressure may violate the customary norm against 
intervention as discussed in Rule 10, subsection 6.  
 92 See id. 
 93 The legendary words, “I know it when I see it” were coined by Supreme Court Justice 
Stewart Potter in the famous obscenity case Jacobellis v. Ohio, 378 U.S. 184, 197 (1964) 
(Stewart, J., concurring). 
 94 The TALLINN MANUAL helpfully gives some sample questions that penetrate to the 
essence of each factor. See TALLINN MANUAL, supra note 12, at 48-51. 
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dispositive of state involvement or a use of force, such an association is so 
elementary that it is almost not even worthy of inclusion, i.e., that a military-style 
cyber operation is so characteristic of a use of force that the articulation of such a 
factor is superfluous, and by mere operation of fact, military character is presumed.  
The factor of “severity” is the most important consideration when characterizing 
a cyber operation as a use of force.95 The Tallinn Manual notes that severity is a de 
minimis element: acts resulting in physical harm to persons or property will always 
be a use of force, while minor acts that are little more than irritating will never be a 
use of force. Cyber operations that fall in the middle, however, are subject to an 
analysis based on the other factors and other subordinate components of “severity” 
such as a state’s critical interests, scope, intensity, and duration. The Manual itself 
notes that the element of severity is by far the most important factor to be used when 
determining if a given act is a use of force.96 
While there are other factors included in Rule Eleven, many of them are ancillary 
to an overall determination of whether a cyber operation is a use of force. As a 
result, a detailed overview of the remaining factors is outside the scope of this 
analysis.  
4. Rule Thirteen: Self-Defence97 Against Armed Attack 
Rule Thirteen contains the most text within the Tallinn Manual relevant to the 
operations and future planning of NATO cybersecurity policy. As noted above, 
Article 5 of the Washington Treaty encapsulates the inherent right to individual and 
collective self-defence as outlined in the UN Charter.98 Thus, how the Manual treats 
the scope of the concept of self-defence is fundamentally critical for NATO. The 
Manual names that the “scale and effects” of a cyber operation are dispositive factors 
in determining whether an act is indeed an “armed attack.”99 Like other legal 
standards adopted by the Manual, the “scale and effects” language is also drawn 
from the wider law of armed conflict.100 Such an approach removes the process of 
determining the legal classification of a given attack from the considerations of 
policy and makes the ultimate determination more empirical. To elaborate, if the 
only important factors are the scale and effects, then issues like the identity or nature 
of the attacker or the means of the attack are irrelevant for the purposes of 
classifying a cyberoperation.101 Subpart 3 of the rule is incredibly important for the 
                                                                                                                                         
 95 Id. (“Subject to a de minimis rule, consequences involving physical harm to persons or 
property will, in and of themselves, qualify as a use of force.”).   
 96 Id. at 48. 
 97 A general note on spelling: NATO and the professionals associated with it commonly 
use “British” spellings of various English words.  
 98 U.N. Charter, art. 51, supra note 8. 
 99 TALLINN MANUAL, supra note 12, at 50. 
 100 Specifically, it is drawn from the Nicaragua judgment of the ICJ. See Id. at 47 n.16. 
 101 To demonstrate the simple wisdom of such an approach, consider the simple case of 
homicide. A police officer or prosecutor does not weigh and compare the identity of the 
suspect, the potential murder weapons, and possible motives in deciding how to classify the 
act (that is, is this a murder, suicide, or accident? The latter two do not require immediate 
action, while the former does because of the threat to the public). He or she simply looks to 
whether the victim has been killed. If so, the immediate response is determined: arrest and 
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purposes of NATO, reiterating the principle that the choice of means is “immaterial 
to the issue of whether an operation qualifies as an armed attack.”102 Such a 
viewpoint, however, may not be shared by some experts and officials within the 
field. But such a stance is not only ignorant of the relevant law, but also displays a 
disconcerting myopia towards future technological developments. While the Tallinn 
Manual adopts a more reasoned and, in this author’s opinion, a wiser approach, if 
NATO officials and policymakers are unable to concede in this area, NATO cyber 
defence policy will be tailored with the assumption that electronic warfare is nothing 
more than an irritating annoyance instead of a potential force multiplier with nearly 
unlimited potential for development.  
But Rule Thirteen does engender some concerns, because the language of “scale 
and effects” is not workable. While the legal doctrine is sound, it is unclear how 
lawyers would implement such a standard in an operational setting. The ICJ opinion 
that birthed the “scale and effects” standard (Nicaragua v. US) was written long after 
the commission of the acts that formed the gravamen of Nicaragua’s complaint.103 A 
lawyer advising a military commander as to the possible responses to a cyber 
operation cannot ascertain the “effects” as the ICJ could. As an illustration of the 
problem with the “scale and effects” language, the ICJ unhelpfully stated that a 
“mere frontier incident” was not an armed attack.104 But is a “frontier incident” really 
a “frontier incident?”105 For the lawyer in the unenviable position of advising a 
commander using the doctrine of Rule Thirteen, the “scale and effects” can really 
only be determined with detailed investigation and careful analysis after the fact. So 
what are the victims of a cyberattack to do in the interim? Perhaps the direness of the 
circumstances should be the diagnostic factor because “scale and effects” are 
especially unhelpful in counteracting a cyberattack in progress. 106 
The standard of “scale and effects” and determining whether a qualifying armed 
attack can trigger the right of self-defence is complicated further by the Group of 
Experts. While they note that the choice of means is “immaterial,” the Group of 
                                                                                                                                         
possible prosecution. An analysis of evidentiary issues and mitigating/aggravating factors 
does not occur ex ante as an initial response, it occurs after necessary measures have been 
taken (since one justification for arresting a suspected killer is to ensure the killer does not kill 
again). 
 102 Id. at 54 n.25 (citing Nuclear Weapons Advisory Opinion ICJ). 
 103 The ICJ handed down the Nicaragua decision in 1986, but the Sandinista fighting 
occurred in the late 1970s. See Nicaragua v. United States, WIKIPEDIA, 
http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Nicaragua_v._United_States (last visited June 3, 2013). 
 104 TALLINN MANUAL, supra note 12, at 56.  
 105 Wars have started more innocuously than through a major cyber attack. For example, 
the invasion of Poland in 1939 (which sparked World War II), started as nothing more than 
German units seizing a border crossing. See John Quigley, Who Admits New Members to the 
United Nations? Think Twice Before You Answer, 44 GEO. WASH. INT’L L. REV. 179, 202 
n.151 (2012). 
 106 The TALLINN MANUAL does provide that a determination of whether a given cyber 
intrusion is an armed attack should occur ex ante, and there is an indication that the 
foreseeability of harm (people becoming sick after ingesting water from an attacked water 
plant) can be a factor. See TALLINN MANUAL, supra note 12, at 57, 60 (subparts 10 and 21). 
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Experts identified (at least in part) that intent/motive,107 individual capacity,108 extent 
of damage,109 private/public property,110 and the status of targeted individuals111 as 
pertinent factors in ascertaining whether the right of self-defense can be triggered. 
As noted above, these additional criterion (or factors), while more useful than a 
vague or tautological standard, will unnecessarily complicate and hinder quick and 
prudent legal calculus. To this end, it seems that the drafters lost sight of the 
practical application of their rules.  
E. Criticism of the Tallinn Manual 
While there are many reasons that indicate that the Tallinn Manual is a well-
drafted document worthy of international recognition, there are some concerns with 
the Manual’s contents that will confound legal scholars and policymakers. First, the 
manual is non-empirical. Unlike a common law court opinion, the Tallinn Manual 
only lists the conclusions of the group of experts. To analogize, it is as if the Manual 
is a collection of ninety-five case holdings with explanations that range from barely 
adequate to exceedingly sparse. There is no comparison of conflicting viewpoints, no 
survey of the evidence—it is as if the Manual exists in some vacuous ephemera aloof 
to policy considerations, current trends, and past events.  
Second, when the Manual does tread upon contentious issues, it barely resolves 
them. Brief synopses of the opinions of the group of experts are included, but such 
inclusions are functionally worthless for scholars and researchers. The Manual 
speaks in terms of “some,” “many,” or “all” when referencing the Group of Experts’ 
opinions on various issues. The substance of their discussions, a record of the vote or 
even the identities of the dissenters could have exponentially increased the 
usefulness of the Manual for those paying attention to the development of law in this 
novel area. If the Manual disclosed which experts came to which specific 
conclusions, it could have facilitated analysis in determining which nations and 
organizations condoned or supported the views of their experts, thus enhancing the 
predictability of the Manual’s implementation. In addition, including such 
information would aid in tracking how pervasively the Manual is being adopted by 
governments and other entities, or aid in identifying potential “differences in 
opinion” among the NATO allies and their professionals.  
Third, the Manual reads as if unsure of its audience. Rule Thirteen meanders 
especially, leaving the reader with as many questions as a first-year law student 
leaving a complex contracts class. In this regard, the Manual seems to be less of a 
Manual and more of a treatise, a voluminous work that sets out roughly crafted rules 
that need revision or refinement. It will be difficult for any lawyer to use the Manual 
as it is for anything more than a foundational, doctrinal document. 
But the Manual also divorces its doctrine from theory, as well as practical 
considerations, and perhaps that is its greatest fault. If theory roughly equates to the 
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goal that the law seeks to achieve,112 then the Group of Experts should have made 
rules that would make it easier for IT personnel, security professionals and lawyers 
to apply the rules in exigent circumstances. In short, the Manual should have 
articulated some guiding principles for practitioners based on the international law. 
Instead, the Rules embody customary international law (except where otherwise 
noted),113 but therein lies the problem. Customary international law remains 
decidedly unclear (or, at the very least, in flux) and, to simply revert to these old 
international norms is to almost state that there is no useful norm at all, like there is 
nothing different or unique about the situations posed by cyber warfare.114 The very 
reason the Tallinn Manual should exist is to guide governments and organizations 
like NATO in a brave, new world of warfare. Thus, if there ever was a chance to 
make the law from scratch, and to truly wax poetic on what that law should look 
like, drafting the Tallinn Manual was that chance. But the Manual is hesitant and 
conservative. For example, the question of whether a cyberattack that crashes a stock 
exchange should constitute an armed attack went unresolved.115 Simply put, the 
Manual could have tackled the more thorny legal issues more earnestly.  
IV. CONCLUSION  
The Tallinn Manual promises to be a seminal document in the “law of 
cyberwarfare.” While the Manual has myriad issues, it stands as a solid theoretical 
statement of the law of armed conflict in the 21st century. Beyond its own strengths, 
the Manual should form the basis of a new experiment in the field of international 
humanitarian law and as such could gain much by using the labors of the 
International Group of Experts. The Manual can be regarded as a conservative, well-
reasoned (albeit imperfect) statement of what the law should be in this exciting new 
field.  
                                                                                                                                         
 112 Or in other words, the goal of theory is to generate solutions to legal problems. See 
Joseph William Singer, The Player and the Cards: Nihilism and Legal Theory, 94 YALE L.J. 
1, 61 (1984) (stating that the goal of theory is to “provide answers”).  
 113 TALLINN MANUAL, supra note 12, at 6.  
 114 See Timothy Meyer, Codifying Custom, 160 U. PA. L. REV. 995, 1002-03 (2012) 
(“Customary international law, as the commonly cited definition goes, ‘results from a general 
and consistent state practice’ done out of ‘a sense of legal obligation.’ This definition, 
although easily stated, turns out to be terribly difficult to apply.”). See generally David H. 
Moore, The President’s Unconstitutional Treatymaking, 59 UCLA L. REV. 598 (2012) 
(noting, in parts, that the extent to which interim treaty obligations attach on the United States 
is unclear, but is unconstitutional); Frederic Sourgens, Law’s Laboratory: Developing 
International Law on Investment Protection as Common Law, 34 NW. J. INT’L  L. & BUS. 181 
(2014) (arguing that investor-state relations are an example of new customary international 
law).  
 115 A brief discussion of a Stock Exchange scenario appeared in a draft of the TALLINN 
MANUAL. TALLINN MANUAL ON INTERNATIONAL LAW APPLICABLE TO CYBER WARFARE (Int’l 
Group of Experts, Working Paper, 2013), available at http://www.knowledgecommons.in/wp-
content/uploads/2014/03/Tallinn-Manual-on-the-International-Law-Applicable-to-Cyber-
Warfare-Draft-.pdf). On page 53 (subpart 9) of the manuscript, Rule Thirteen was later 
removed from the document (at least, according to this author’s research). In any event, it is 
probable that the International Group of Experts was unwilling to commit to any one 
approach. See id. 
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If the efficacy of an alliance is measured by how well it keeps the peace among 
its constituents, NATO is indeed successful. Outside of a few terrorist attacks, the 
members of NATO have remained more or less protected and secure for the greater 
part of the Alliance’s history. Yet prevention requires prospection. NATO must be 
cognizant of not only current trends but also future possibilities. The Tallinn Manual 
is a necessary first step in the development of NATO’s capabilities in cyberwarfare. 
While not a panacea, the Manual has the capability to align itself with NATO’s 
preventative outlook by providing the Alliance with the tools to make cyberconflict 
less anarchic and less uncertain. If nation-states operate in cyberspace like they did 
prior to the promulgation of the major international human rights and international 
humanitarian law treaties, commerce, communication, diplomacy and political 
cooperation will undoubtedly suffer from the incursions of unbridled cyberattacks. 
While some “rules” may be obeyed in the interim, the protocols for cyberconflict 
may be abandoned when necessary or convenient.  
While it would be incredible to argue that information warfare, left legally 
unchecked, could wreak as much havoc as its kinetic cousins, the wise may 
nevertheless be concerned. Just because the harm to be prevented is not as invidious 
as its kin does little to convince the vigilant that action is any less necessary. 
Undoubtedly, the outlandishness of the hypothetical cyber-bogeyman disarms even a 
well-reasoned analysis—and may be responsible for the academy’s overall lack of 
interest in the Manual and cyber warfare.116  
In sum, the Tallinn Manual represents a solid effort to state the current law as it 
applies to current situations. Given the overall dearth of bright line rules and 
practical principles, the Manual is more of a treatise, but is nevertheless a bold step 
forward. In considering NATO’s history, encounters with cyberconflict, and the 
overall international political attitudes towards cyberconflict, the Tallinn Manual’s 
rules and commentaries may soon need revision. In any case, the generals, lawyers, 
and politicians that make up NATO and lead its constituent countries will need 
additional guidance in this new era of cyber warfare. 
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